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Abstract 
Variations between the diverse pension systems in the member states of the European Union 
hamper labour market mobility, across country borders but also within the countries of the 
European Union. From a macroeconomic perspective, and in the light of demographic pressure, 
this paper argues that allowing individual instead of collective pension building would greatly 
improve labour market flexibility and thus enhance the functioning of the monetary union. I 
argue that working citizens would benefit, for three reasons, from pension saving in a risk-free 
savings account. First, citizens would have a clear picture of the accumulation of their own 
pension savings throughout their working life. Second, they would pay hardly any extra costs 
and, third, once retired they would not be subject to the whims of government or other pension 
fund managers. This paper investigates the feasibility of individual pension building under 
various parameter settings by calculating the pension saved during a working life and the 
pension dis-saved after retirement. The findings show that there are no reasons why the 
European Union and individual member states should not allow individual risk-free pension 
savings accounts. This would have macroeconomic benefits and provide a solid pension 
provision that can enhance mobility, instead of engaging workers in different mandatory 
collective pension schemes that exist around in the European Union.  
Key words: pensions, labour market, monetary union.  
JEL classification: G23, H55, H75, H83, J11, J26, J32, J61.  
                                                          
11 I wish to thank the following people for their useful remarks (without implicating them) Elisa Boelman, 
Martin M.G. Fase, Loek Groot, Petry Kievit-Tyson, André Kolodziejak and Sandra Rompelberg. I am 
grateful to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study (NIAS) for providing me with the opportunity, as 
a Fellow-in-Residence, to complete this paper. Comments and questions are always welcome. 
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Better safe than sorry - 
 Méfiance est mère de sûreté –  
Vorsicht ist die Mutter der Porzellankiste –  
Más vale colorado una vez que ciento amarillo–  
Beter hard geblazen dan de mond gebrand –  
Καλύτερη ασφαλή από τη θεραπεία – 
 Meglio andare sul sicoro, che poi pentirsi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
One in ten European citizens has lived in more than one European Union country, usually for 
work reasons. Job-mobility is an indicator of the flexibility of the labour market and is vital for 
the well-functioning of the European Economic and Monetary Union. Nevertheless, individual 
workers are hampered by the patchwork of social security systems across the Union. Workers 
who frequently switch jobs participate in various pension schemes from different governments 
and pension funds and tend to lose sight of their rights and entitlements. This lack of 
transparency for the job-switching working EU citizen is particularly unfortunate as pension 
payments can amount to 30% of his gross salary. 
Each of the 27 member states of the EU has its own pension system existing of a first, often 
second and also third pillar.2 All countries have a state pension system as the first pillar, yet 
pension payments and pension outcomes differ. Some countries have a pay-as-you-go system as 
the second pillar while others have a funded system and both these systems exist in many 
different forms. The third pillar consists of private savings. The lack of coherence between all 
these different systems does not encourage labour mobility within countries and definitely 
hampers mobility across the EU borders.  
Pension contributions are usually mandatory and collective. In most EU-countries, citizens have 
no direct say in how these funds are invested and can only hope that the outcome will be 
sufficient for their retirement. The global financial crisis of 2008-09 did not improve matters 
and has had a negative impact on the EU-citizens’ confidence in institutional investors and 
                                                          
2 Individual accounts are less uncommon in other parts of the world, outside the European Union. See for 
instance Holzberg and Palacios (2001). 
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Ministries of Finance as the guardians of their pension funds. In countries where pension 
systems depend on investment returns the situation has worsened as monetary policy has 
loosened, stock markets have been volatile and depressed, and the safe haven of the 
government bond has been under pressure. Moreover, the poor state of public finances in many 
EU countries casts a shadow over pension payments by governments of the future. Due to high 
public debt and high public deficits, state-pension payments are more under pressure than ever 
before.  
Citizens need to have a clear picture of their pension funds during their (on average) long 
working and retirement life. Individual risk-free pension schemes could provide full clarity but 
only under the precondition that pension savings accumulated during a working life are 
sufficient to cover the total pension payments throughout the estimated length of retirement 
life.  
This paper looks at the individual risk-free pension scheme and examines the advantages it 
could offer working European Union citizens who wish to cross national borders during their 
careers. The life plans of an average worker in the EU will be explored in terms of different 
parameter settings looking at: salary growth, pension savings, length of working life, number of 
years in retirement, the level of pension payments and the rates of return on savings. Analyses 
will show whether the individual risk-free pension scheme is feasible and whether the average 
worker would be able to make ends meet. The advantages are discussed from an average 
worker’s point of view and from a macroeconomic perspective and examined in the light of 
counterarguments. Relevant literature will be cited although there is currently not much known 
about individual risk-free pension schemes as they do not seem to be in use except in Chile. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses labour mobility in the EU from a 
macro point of view in-depth. Section 3 studies an individual EU-worker’s income during his 
lifespan. Section 4 generalises the individual example given in section 3 and analyses the 
outcomes for pension savings under different parameter settings in order to study the pay 
ability of an individual worker. Section 5 summarizes the main benefits of an individual risk-
free pension scheme for an individual EU worker. Section 6 gives counterarguments, asking the 
question why we should not be in favour of an individual risk-free pension scheme. Section 7 
summarizes, concludes and gives recommendations for policy steps.  
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2. The importance of labour mobility and the role of pensions  
The European Economic and Monetary Union in which seventeen economies have a common 
monetary policy and common currency, is in need of further economic integration. Only 
adjustment mechanisms in either public finance or the labour market are able to mitigate the 
effects of asymmetric shocks. The asymmetric shocks that hit several member states in the 
aftermath of the global economic crisis (2008-09) caused sovereign debt crises in Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal. Common monetary policy cannot be adapted to target these problem 
countries specifically. Exchange rates are fixed and interest rates are basically common and 
therefore not feasible policy instruments for countries hit by asymmetric shocks. As a 
consequence, in the absence of a common fiscal policy, a good functioning labour market is 
crucial.3  
Quickly matching labour supply and labour demand would not increase unemployment levels 
and flexible wages would function as a price mechanism to match supply and demand. Excess 
labour supply in certain countries or regions in the EU could cancel out excess labour demand in 
other areas of the EU. Flexible labour-markets cushion the effects of asymmetric shocks and can 
absorb or even prevent future shocks. Moreover, a flexible labour market can keep wage growth 
moderate, which improves international competitiveness and helps in maintaining price 
stability. However, a precondition for flexible labour-market functioning is that people are in a 
position (both financially and socially) to move from one region to another and thus supply 
their labour. 
The literature shows that labour market mobility in the EU has been low (see for instance 
Huber, 2004 or Cavelaars and Hessel, 2007), although each EU citizen has the right to live and 
work in every other country in the EU. As a positive token, labour mobility within the EU is 
increasing. Gross migration outflows from the new member states Bulgaria and Romania that 
joined the EU in 2007, more than doubled from 2.7 per thousand inhabitants in 2000 to 7.1 in 
2008 and from 3.4 to 7.6 (see Table 1). Migration from Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal and the Slovak Republic has increased significantly. In total, the number of migrants 
within the EU increased from 548,000 in 2000 to almost a million in 2008, and the year before 
the global crisis 2007 peaked at 1,114 million. Although these are gross flows, it is likely that 
many of these migrants moved to another EU country for work.  
                                                          
3 See also Peeters and Den Reijer (2011), who study the accommodation of the common monetary policy 
by labour market adjustments in the sense of wage coordination in the EU according to the Euro-Plus-
Pact, or Jousten and Pestieau (2002), on the need for reform in the EU, while Razin and Sadka (1999) 
justify international migration in the context of pensions. 
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Table 1 Migration, labour market space and ageing indicators in the EU member states 
    Migration outflow to other EU countries Labour market space working-age to old-age 
    2000 2008 2008 
change from 2010 to 
2050 
    per thousand inhabitants 
% working age 
population persons 
1 Austria 1.9 1.6 44 -2.5 
2 Belgium 1.0 0.8 52 -1.5 
3 Bulgaria 2.7 7.1 44 -2.0 
4 Cyprus 0.9 0.4 38 -3.7 
5 Czech R 1.3 1.3 36 -2.7 
6 Denmark 1.8 1.5 41 -1.5 
7 Estonia 0.9 3.6 37 -1.6 
8 Finland 1.7 1.3 41 -1.6 
9 France 0.9 0.8 51 -1.6 
10 Germany 0.6 1.0 51 -1.5 
11 Greece 2.4 1.1 39 -1.8 
12 Hungary 2.1 3.7 46 -1.9 
13 Ireland 1.5 0.9 34 -3.3 
14 Italy 0.9 1.1 49 -1.6 
15 Latvia     37 -1.6 
16 Lithuania     47 -1.8 
17 Luxembourg 1.8 5.7 25 -2.6 
18 Malta 0.1 0.7 54 -2.9 
19 Netherlands 1.4 1.9 48 -2.2 
20 Poland 2.4 5.9 51 -3.2 
21 Portugal 2.1 3.2 38 -2.2 
22 Romania 3.4 7.6 41 -2.6 
23 Slovak Rep 8.3 12.8 48 -3.9 
24 Slovenia 0.5 0.5 43 -2.4 
25 Spain 0.5 0.4 49 -2.4 
26 Sweden 1.2 0.9 41 -1.2 
27 UK 0.8 1.0 42 -1.5 
EU in persons 548,000 930,000     
Source: Own calculations based on OECD and UN statistics. 
 
The total number of citizens residing in other EU member states than their own was almost 12 
million in 2009, which is 2.4% of the total EU population. Among all EU nationals in 2009, 10% 
had at least once lived and worked abroad in their lives. This indicates that labour mobility is 
significant in the EU (see Graph II.3.I, European Commission, 2011).  
In view of demographic developments in the EU, the expectation is that there will be more 
pressure to increase labour mobility in the future decades. According to the population 
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projections of the United Nations, all EU countries are ageing. In Sweden, the ratio of the 
working-age population (i.e. 15 to 65 years old) and the retirement-age population (i.e. above 
65) is expected to decrease in the period from 2010 to 2050 (see Table 1, last column). Instead 
of 3.6:1 the proportion of working-age versus retired persons is expected to drop to 2.4:1 
respectively. In terms of the production of goods, the supply of services, but also fiscal spending 
on older citizens, this means less support. 
Sweden is the EU country that is ageing least. At the other end of the spectrum, is the Slovak 
Republic with a decrease of 3.9 working-age citizens predicted (from 6.0:1 to 2.1:1 retired 
citizen). Thus, in 2050 it is predicted that there will be only two productive Slovak citizens of 
working age to support each retired person. A decreasing group of working-age citizens will 
have to provide health care and other services for an increasing group of elderly. Only a flexible 
labour market will be able to ensure enough qualified workers are available to fill existing job 
vacancies. Unless working-age people, who currently do not work full-time, become fully 
available in the labour market place, demographic pressure will encourage more cross-border 
movement of workers. Temporary contracts, offering people fees to be hired rapidly, will also 
be conducive to the functioning of the labour market, as demand can meet supply timely. Groot 
and Peeters (2011) showed that, in terms of labour market space availability and future fiscal 
expenditure on old-age pensions, among the European countries, Poland and Greece will suffer 
most from the impact of aging populations. 
Pensions, in particular the non-state pensions, are a major impediment to labour mobility.4 In 
most EU countries, domestic pension portability is not easy. Switching jobs often means that the 
accumulated pension funds remain with the previous pension fund and are not carried over to 
the fund connected with the new position.5 Between EU countries, pension portability is even 
more difficult, costly and sometimes impossible. Regulatory systems differ widely and switching 
jobs is time consuming and entails high administrative costs. An individual worker who changes 
jobs is faced with a fragmented pension fund accumulation that is located with various previous 
and current employer(s)6. 
                                                          
4 In saying that pension non-portability is a major impediment to labour market mobility in the EU, I 
follow the European Commission (2010a, 2010b), Cavelaars and Hessel (2007) and first-hand experience 
concerning colleagues of all ranks and ages in the EU.  
5 See for instance Fuchs et al. (2006) for an overview of the EU-25 countries, the OECD (2011), Arza and 
Kohli (2008) or Börsch-Supan (2006). 
6 Although EU regulations on the coordination of social security systems have protected the pension 
rights of mobile EU citizens for the past five decades, these regulations are limited to statutory and 
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Figure 1 Pension contributions in relation to pension benefits in EU countries 
 
Source: Authors’ based on OECD data 
Note: These are contributions and benefits for public pensions in 2007. Denmark is not included as it has 
private scheme only. Ireland, Portugal and the UK have no separate pension contributions. The other EU-
countries were not included because of a lack of information. There is also insufficient information on 
contributions to (mandatory) private pension schemes, but the picture is likely to be even more disperse. 
For precise definitions and differences across countries, see Adema and Ladaique (2009). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
occupational pension schemes, discriminatory tax rules are an obstacle to the mobility of pensions, and 
tracing services cannot give sufficient transparency (see European Commission Green Paper (2010a)). 
These regulations do not yet cover the portability of supplementary pensions, implying that pension 
entitlements cannot be transferred to a new scheme in case of professional mobility.  
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Fragmented pension savings and a lack of transparency about the outcome of future pension 
benefits, makes people wary. In their search for job market opportunities, they will tend to look 
within their own countries rather than go across the border to a neighbouring EU country 
unless wages are significantly higher (such as between the east and the west, for instance). 
Figure 1 gives an indication of the different levels of public pension benefits among countries. 
Reliable and comparable information on the public pension benefits is given for 14 EU-
countries. The y-axis gives the public pensions’ benefits in 2007. 
The public pension benefits range from 500 euro in the Slovak Republic to 2,300 in 
Luxembourg. The pension contributions by the employee and the employer, as indicated at the 
x-axis, range from 15 up to 33% of the gross wage. This shows the size of the differences.7 A 
worker who is mobile and switches jobs within the EU is not only faced with huge differences in 
the public pension schemes, but also a wide variety of private schemes across EU-countries. 
Private schemes are even more varied, as some countries have mandatory and other non-
mandatory schemes, again with different sizes of contributions and different associated benefit 
outcomes. The accumulated pension entitlements on retirement are thus a patchwork of 
different schemes. Even if there is an overview of the pension benefits available this is not easy 
to understand. 
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, labour mobility should be stimulated instead of hampered, 
so mobile workers should be rewarded not punished. As the average working lifetime is long, 
notably more than 40 years, people usually only start to think about the effective result of their 
pension funds at a late stage. At that point in life, it is often more difficult to catch-up with lost or 
low savings. If the accumulated savings do not suffice for covering, let us say, 30 years after 
retirement from the labour market, the worker could seek opportunities to replenish the funds. 
Finding another job with a better salary or working more hours is generally easier for younger 
workers who are more flexible.  
In the literature, researchers discuss the problems workers have in adapting to a different 
cultural environment or housing as the obstructions to labour market mobility within the EU. 
But adapting pensions would be a more effective policy instrument as this can be implemented 
by policy makers whereas it is more difficult to overcome workers cultural preferences. 
                                                          
7
 Paradoxically, the contributions are low at 16% in Luxembourg, while they are high at almost 25% in 
the Slovak Republic. As a consequence, persons that worked in Luxembourg and therefore have pension 
entitlements in Luxembourg is much better off than workers with entitlements in the Slovak Republic. 
They contributed far less but receive far more. 
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Financial or material goods can be provided, but the important aspect of integrating and settling 
into a new culture or living environment depends on the individual worker. In contrast, it is 
easier for the policy makers to adapt the pension system to encourage migrant workers. As 
pensions are deferred salaries, it is a matter of offering the worker the best prospects for future 
pension payments. Pensions can thus be used as a policy instrument to attract working-age 
persons to jobs elsewhere in the EU. This holds for fixed tenure jobs but especially for 
temporary jobs and would help fill the labour market vacancies in the EU that are hard to fill. I 
only need to define what best prospects means.8 Whatever the case, from a worker’s 
perspective, policies that allow the accumulation of pension-savings independent of any EU-
employer are the best choice.9 
This brings us to pension portability in its easiest form, the feasibility of pension scheme for an 
individual worker, mandatory but risk-free saving. I analyse under which parameter settings 
such a pension scheme breaks even or exceeds the pension needs at retirement. Thereafter, I 
come back to possible disadvantages or differences of pension systems that are individual or 
collective or otherwise. This section can be summarized as follows. An individual pension 
scheme in the EU is conducive to labour mobility, and hence the functioning of the EU labour 
market, as it helps encouraging workers to cross borders to accept jobs. 
  
                                                          
8 The size of the pension contributions and the pension benefit, the length of the working life are among 
the factors that determine the goodness of a pension system. But also the risk-return trade off plays a 
role. Each of these factors is discussed in the next sections.  
9
 Borgy and Chojnicki (2008) study ten regions in the world in an overlapping-generations model and 
conclude that the EU needs to reform its pension systems, even if many migrants enter the EU. On the 
unsustainability of public finances, see also the specific case of Jarret (2011). 
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3. Illustrative example of an individual risk-free pension scheme for Mr X 
This section clarifies the specific meaning in this paper of individual and risk-free pension 
scheme, by using an example of a representative worker in the EU. I call this person Mr X. 
Mr X starts working at the age of 22 and retires at the official retirement age of 67 years. He 
starts with an annual salary of € 20,000 that increases at 2% each year, a rise that is equal to the 
annual inflation rate during his full 45 years’ working life. According to wage bargaining or 
regulation agreements, Mr X saves 7% of his salary and his employer contributes twice this 
amount. He and his employer deposit these pension contributions in a tax-free savings account 
in a bank. The savings account carries Mr X’s name, so Mr X is the only owner. However, Mr X 
has no access to the funds deposited until he reaches retirement age. This is a so-called blocked 
account, in that the owner of the account, and anybody else, can deposit money but neither the 
owner, nor anyone else, can withdraw money until the fixed savings term has passed, coinciding 
with retirement age. After the fixed term has passed the owner, Mr X in this case, is entitled to 
use the money and, in this example, his savings will have accrued at a fixed interest rate of 4% 
each year. 
Figure 2 (orange line) shows the development of the salaries of Mr X during a working life of 45 
years, from 22 to 67 years of age. At the age of 66, his salary is almost €49,000, so the salary 
more than doubled due to the 2% salary-growth during 45 years with year-on-year increases. 
Figure 2 (dark green line) illustrates also the accrued funds in the savings account. At a 
retirement age of 67 these funds will have reached €720,000 (as indicated at the right axis). 
This nest egg consists of the pension contributions and the savings due to interest, roughly 
300,000 to 400,000 euros. Therefore, the interest savings are higher than the pension 
contribution, showing the importance of receiving interest over interest over a long period.  
At the age of 67, Mr X’s account is unblocked and he starts withdrawing money at 70% of his 
last earned salary being €35,000 (=€49,000*0.7). This is his pension benefit (see green line in 
Figure 2). In the subsequent years, he withdraws the same amount as the previous year but with 
an increase of 2% to compensate for consumer price inflation. He can do this up until the age of 
94, when his savings reach zero. As the graph illustrates, the decumulation of his savings takes 
place in a non-linear way, the reason being that the remaining money in the savings account is 
still receiving a 4% interest rate. Because of the fixed long-term savings plan, this interest rate 
has remained the same over the working and retirement period. 
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Figure 2 Mr X’s salaries, pension benefits and accumulation of pension funds 
in euros 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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This last feature is important. It indicates that the saved contributions are long-term savings 
and therefore accrue at a relatively high interest rate. Mr X saves the first pension contribution 
earned at the age of 22 for 45 years. He saves the pension contribution earned at age 23 also for 
45 years, as at the age of 67 he only consumes a small sum of money in view of all the interest 
accrued on his first salary (earned at the age of 22) this suffices. 
Mr X does not necessarily have to work his whole life in the same country or with the same 
employer. The only relevant parameters in this example are his starting wage (€20,000), the 
length of his working life (45 years), his annual salary increase (2%), the pension contributions 
(21% of his salary, of which 7% contributed by the employee and thus 14% by the employer)10, 
the interest rate on savings (4%) and the replacement rate at retirement (70% of the last 
earned salary). The outcome is that Mr X has secure pension benefits for more than 25 years. 
Consumer price inflation equalling the nominal increase in the salaries as well as the pension 
benefits, the real income remains at the same level during Mr X’s whole life. To what extent 
various combinations of these parameters could lead to higher life cycle income outcomes is 
examined in the next section.  
The pension scheme described in this example is individual as Mr X possesses all his 
accumulated funds in a bank account that is only in his name. The scheme is risk-free, due to the 
fact that Mr X receives a fixed interest rate, independent of financial market or other factors of 
uncertainty. Furthermore, this scheme is mandatory, as Mr X has to save for his pension and 
cannot use the accumulated funds for consumption purposes before his retirement. Finally, to 
use the terminology of pension literature and pension policy discussions, the employer and 
employee have negotiated the pension contributions and not the future pension benefits, so the 
scheme is a defined contribution (DC) and not a defined benefit (DB). In all these aspects, this 
scheme is thus rather basic.  
  
                                                          
10 The division of the pension contributions among the employer and the employee that is 2:1 here is 
assumed to be part of the job negotiation process.
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4. Straightforward specifications and scenario analyses 
This section specifies in general terms Mr X’s lifetime income. The resulting inequality is used to 
show pension outcomes under different parameter settings. 
 
        4.1  Individual risk-free pension savings specification 
The pension contributions saved in year t, denoted as   , are based on the initial gross wage,  , 
that grows with   and depends on the rate of pension contributions  . It follows that 
 
        (   )
  
(1) 
With   the nominal savings interest rate, the accumulated pension savings are at the end of the 
working life of T years, 
                ∑   
 
   
(   )    
(2) 
Assuming the pension period to be K years, the stream of the pension benefits    at the age of 
retirement at period T reads as follows  
              ∑
  
(   ) 
 
   
 
(3) 
with r the nominal discount rate.11 The pension replacement rate,  , defines the first pension 
benefit in relation to the last earned wage,  . Adjusted for the consumer price inflation, 
        (   ) 
(4a) 
and in the subsequent years this first pension benefit grows again at the inflation rate  , so 
 
      (   )
     for            
(4b) 
It should hold that individuals save as much money during their working lives as needed for 
their retirement. I will consider this a requirement, and take the retirement age as 
                                                          
11 In the example of Mr X, as discussed in the previous section, this discount rate equals the nominal 
savings interest rate, so    . I generalise in this specification and allow for the possibility that Mr X can 
dispose of his savings after his retirement for which reason these are no longer long-term savings, which 
may, therefore, mature at a lower interest rate, hence    . 
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measurement point in time, that is year T. The total lifetime income Ω in year T, that is the 
stream of pension savings at retirement age T minus the stream of pension needs during the K 
retirement years, should thus be positive, that is  
                                 0 
(5) 
Substituting (2) and (3) in (5), and subsequently substituting (1) and (4a)-(4b) for S and P, 
respectively, it then holds that 
∑      (   )
 
 
   
(   )    ∑
    (   )
 
(   ) 
 
   
   
⇔ 
     (   )
  ∑ (
   
   
)
  
   
      ∑ (
   
   
)
  
   
   
⇔ 
     {(   )
  
      
   
}       {
      
   
} 
(6) 
with    
   
   
 and   
   
   
.  
This last inequality states that the initial pension savings (    ) should precisely match or 
exceed the pension benefit in the retirement year (    ), where this pension saving is accrued 
to the retirement moment by the first term in curly brackets and this pension benefit is 
discounted with the second term in curly brackets. Logically, the higher the wage growth   
during the working life, the higher the accrual of pension funds (term left of the inequality sign). 
In the same vein, the higher the pension benefit growth  , the higher the pension needs (term 
right of the equality sign). However, while the nominal savings rate ( ) pushes savings upward 
(term left of the equality sign), higher nominal savings rates after retirement (r) depress the 
pension needs as the remaining savings accrue more quickly. As an extreme case, which is 
illustrative, assuming          , it follows that  
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This implies that the initial pension saving times the number of working years should precisely 
match or exceed the initial pension benefit multiplied by the number of retirement years. It is 
the example of a non-growing economy without inflation, wage growth or interest payments.12 
As it holds that the pension contribution at the moment of retirement is simply the first earned 
pension contribution accrued with the wage growth, that is      (   )
 , substitution in 
equation (6) gives after division of both sides by   (   )
  
      
      
   
   
      
   
 
⇔ 
 
 
 
      
   
 
    
       
 
(7) 
Interestingly, this shows that the initial wage plays no role in making the pension savings 
exactly match or exceed the pension needs. The reason is that a person with a high wage will 
proportionately have also a high pension benefit, and a person with a relatively low wage a 
relatively low pension benefit. However, the parameters that indicate the amount of pension 
contribution ( ) and the pension replacement rate ( ) as a proportion of the initial wage, play a 
crucial role. Apart from these two parameters, there are six other key parameters. 
To summarize, inequality (7) contains the following parameters: 
1. The pension contribution rate  . 
2. The wage growth rate  . 
3. The length of the working life  . 
4. The nominal rate of return on savings  . 
5. The pension replacement rate  . 
6. The growth rate of pension benefits  . 
7. The length of the retirement period . 
8. The discount rate of pension payments  . 
In the examples below, I assume that some of these parameters are fixed and I show outcomes 
for differing values for the other parameters.  
                                                          
12 At second sight, this case is not so extreme as the same inequality holds in case the (wage or price) 
inflation on income equals the nominal interest rate during the working and the retirement life, that is 
    and    . This is the case where the return on savings vanishes due to relatively high wage or 
pension benefit inflation. 
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4.2  Pension outcomes under different scenario settings 
Figure 3 shows preliminary findings, where (7) was used at equality. I first show the trade-off 
between the number of working to retirement years, on the one hand, and the pension 
contribution to replacement rate, on the other hand. The more years a person works, the lower 
is the pension contribution rate that this person needs ceteris paribus. In the same vein, the 
more years a person needs pension benefits after retiring, the lower must be the pension 
replacement rate ceteris paribus in order for the equality to hold. To illustrate this in an example 
with numbers, there is a dotted line at the point on the horizontal axis where T/K=40/20=2 that 
points at a situation in which the individual worker wants to accumulate pension savings for a 
retirement period of 20 years during a working life period of 40 years (case A). Following the 
dotted line upwards, one reaches the dark green line, being the isoquant that gives the border 
between the left area where the inequality (7) does not hold, and the right area where it holds. 
Following then the dotted line to the left, one reaches the vertical axis at point 0.27. This is the 
pension contribution for replacement rate. Assuming that replacement rate is 0.7, this implies 
that the pension contribution is 19%. This is less than in the example with Mr X in the previous 
section. Sharing the contributions with the employer and assuming that the employer 
contributes double that of the worker, it implies that the worker only has to save little more 
than 6% of his wage. Thus, a worker with a retirement period of 20 year, and replacement rate 
of 0.7, needs to work at least 40 years if he and his employer pay 19% on pension contributions 
(by him and his employer together). Or, if he works less than 40 years, they should at least pay a 
pension contribution of more than 19%.  
If this worker only worked 20 years, followed by a retirement period of 20 years, the 
contribution would need to rise considerably. In this case T/K=20/20=1 which shows (see the 
dark green line) that the pension contribution should be at least 0.7 times the replacement rate. 
This is case B in the figure. Assuming again a replacement rate of 0.7, this implies that pension 
contribution would have to rise to almost 50%, so little over 16% for the employee if the 
employer contributes 33%. Interestingly, if the employee works 30 years and has a retirement 
period of 30 years, the situation at the isoquant with the light green line holds. See case C. In this 
case, the ratio of the pension contribution to the replacement rate drops to 0.6, and pension 
contribution of 40% holds for the replacement rate to remain at 0.7. Working for 10 years 
longer is thus proportionally more beneficial as the accumulation of funds significantly 
increases and this ensures the payment of pension benefits for a much longer period (see also 
Table 2). 
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Figure 3 Trade-off contribution-to-replacement rate and work-to retirement years 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation according to equation (7). 
In the calculations shown in Figure 3, the interest rates equal 4% and income growth rates 
equal 2% (         and         ). In order to see the impact of these rates on the 
pension contribution rate, I fix now the number of working years to 45, the number of 
retirement years to 30 and the replacement rate again to 0.7. This is a prudent scenario in that 
the worker does not risk ending up with low funds as one receives benefits until the age of 97 in 
case one retires at the age of 67, which is far above the average expected mortality. In addition, 
receiving 0.7 of the last-earned wage is much. Many EU countries take the average wage income 
during the lifetime as starting point and even then do not reach 70% of this at the retirement 
age. This paper, sticks to inflation rates of 2%, as well as for wage growth.  
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Figure 4 Pension contribution rate in case of different savings rates 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation according to equation (7). 
The results in Figure 4 show that where the outcomes for the required pension contribution 
rate in case of a savings rate during the working period varies from 0 to 8% (this is the  ) and 
the savings rate during the retirement period (this is the discount rate r) varies from 0 to 8% 
also. The case where both rates equal 0% is extreme, and in fact unrealistic. For this case the 
figure shows that the savings rate should be 1, that is one should pay an amount equal to the 
wage in each period. The more realistic range is where the savings rate during the working 
period is between 3% and 6%, as these are average returns on savings.13  
If the savings rate during the working-period is 3% and 3% during the retirement period, the 
required pension contribution is 32%. If the savings rate during the working period increases 
to, for instance, 4%, this contribution falls to 25%. This implies that the worker would only have 
to pay 8%, if his employer contributes double the share. These calculations show that pension 
contribution can be low. Of interest is the savings rate during retirement. If the worker does not 
opt for long-term savings in this period, the return on his saved pension funds will be lower 
than during his working life, when he is forced to save his funds on a blocked savings account 
and hence enjoys a high interest rate. Figure 4 with our calculations here shows that the 
required pension contribution remain low at 20-30% if this savings rate is only 2%, shown by 
the blue area. This is a good outcome. . 
                                                          
13 See the next section where this range is elaborated. 
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Table 2 Required pension contribution rate with different parameter settings 
savings interest rate ρ=0.0 ρ=0.02 ρ=0.04 ρ=0.06 ρ=0.08 
number of working years         
T=30 0.79 0.60 0.45 0.33 0.23 
T=35 0.71 0.52 0.37 0.25 0.17 
T=40 0.65 0.45 0.30 0.19 0.12 
T=45 0.60 0.40 0.25 0.15 0.09 
number of retirement years         
K=20 0.55 0.42 0.31 0.23 0.16 
K=25 0.68 0.52 0.38 0.28 0.20 
K=30 0.79 0.60 0.45 0.33 0.23 
K=35 0.90 0.69 0.51 0.37 0.27 
pension replacement rate         
μ=0.5 0.57 0.43 0.32 0.23 0.17 
μ=0.6 0.68 0.52 0.39 0.28 0.20 
μ=0.7 0.79 0.60 0.45 0.33 0.23 
μ=0.8 0.91 0.69 0.51 0.37 0.27 
salary growth           
δ=0.01 0.70 0.52 0.38 0.28 0.19 
δ=0.02 0.79 0.60 0.45 0.33 0.23 
δ=0.03 0.90 0.69 0.52 0.39 0.28 
δ=0.04 1.01 0.79 0.60 0.45 0.33 
pension benefit growth         
π=0.01 0.69 0.52 0.39 0.28 0.20 
π=0.02 0.79 0.60 0.45 0.33 0.23 
π=0.03 0.92 0.70 0.52 0.38 0.27 
π=0.04 1.07 0.82 0.61 0.44 0.32 
savings rate on pension funds during retirement       
r=0.01 1.07 0.82 0.61 0.44 0.32 
r=0.02 0.92 0.70 0.52 0.38 0.27 
r=0.03 0.79 0.60 0.45 0.33 0.23 
r=0.04 0.69 0.53 0.39 0.28 0.20 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on equation (7).  
Note: The standard scenario sets the parameters at T=45, K=30,      ,          and 
      . Values in bold highlight the cases with pension contribution at or lower than 45%. 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, which presents an overview of the required pension contribution rate 
in case of different parameter settings, there are ample cases where this contribution is at or 
below 45% (that is 15% for the employee if the employer pays 30%). In the standard scenario 
the parameters are set at T=45, K=30,      ,          and       . The savings interest 
rate during the working life varies from 0% to 8% in steps of two percentage points, column-
wise. As can be seen in the top row, a working life of 30 years and a savings interest rate of 4% 
requires a pension contribution of 45%. Increasing the working life to 45 years makes this 
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contribution decrease to 25%. Increasing the working life thus significantly decreases the 
contribution. At this interest rate on savings if keeping the working life at 45 years, but 
decreasing the replacement rate from 0.7 to 0.5 of the last earned salary shifts the pension 
contribution from 45% to 32%, as follows from the third panel. Combined scenarios are 
particularly interesting, for instance with this 4% savings interest rate, the working life of 45 
years and a replacement rate of 0.5 makes the required pension contribution falls to only 18% 
(not shown in Table 2, but is computable by interpolation). 
As can be seen in Table 2, only cases where the savings interest rate is zero are impossible 
situations. In such cases the pension contribution would need to be exorbitantly high because 
the accumulation of funds stagnates. Most other situations would be acceptable, even if   is only 
2%. 
In real life, however, an individual worker cannot influence certain factors. Savings and inflation 
rates, but also salary growth, are impossible to influence. A worker can however choose to work 
longer or to agree to a lower pension replacement rate. If it is assumed that a worker does not 
want to pay together with the contribution by his employer, a higher pension contribution than 
45%, he can work out his combination of working life and replacement that meets this 
requirement. A possibility is that he works 35 years and receives 80% of his last earned salary 
as pension benefits after retirement. Or, alternatively, he compromises on 50% of his last 
earned salary, in which case he only needs to work 25 years. This can be seen in Figure 5, where 
the dark green line gives all possible combinations of the replacement rate and the number of 
working years for      . Opting for a lower pension contribution rate, of 30%, automatically 
implies that the worker has to work longer at the same replacement rate or needs to agree with 
a lower replacement rate at the same number of working years.  
All in all, these calculations show that in terms of feasibility there are various options available 
to individual workers to ensure that they have enough income during their lives even if savings 
interest rates are moderate. Moreover, in view of the monetary policy objective of price stability 
in the European Economic and Monetary Union, inflation and nominal interest tend to move in 
line with each other so there is hardly a risk of loss of purchasing power. If inflation increases, 
(policy) interest rates tend to increase, which keeps the value of the savings in the fund 
constant. For this reason the pension benefits keep their value in real terms (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 5 Trade-off between working year and replacement rate at fixed contribution rate 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation according to equation (7). 
 
 
Figure 6 Real interest rate returns 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank 
Note:  The 10-year nominal interest rate is the interest rate on German Pfandbriefe with a 
maturity of 9-10 years. The inflation is the (harmonised) consumer price inflation of Germany. 
The real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the inflation.  Although a Pfandbrief is a 
bond and thus not 100% risk-free, the savings account proposed in this study approaches its 
features and therefore the Pfandbriefe’s return is indicative for the nominal returns. These 
returns remained high at 4%, even in global recession year 2009, as this figure shows.  
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5. Benefits of individual risk-free pension schemes for workers 
The example in section 3 showed Mr X’s pension scheme during his life and the generalisations 
made in the previous section once more underline the possibility of pension savings for a long 
retirement period of even 30 years or more with reasonable pension contributions under 
various settings of the savings rate, inflation and the replacement rate. From the viewpoint of 
the worker, there are obvious advantages to this individual pension scheme in comparison with 
a collective pension scheme. Moreover, also the risk-free characteristic associated with savings 
has special advantages. 
First of all, the accumulation and, after retirement, decumulation of funds is transparent for the 
worker. By placing the funds in an individual bank account that the worker owns no one else 
can interfere, deduct money or change the lump sum apart from the interest payments that are 
deposited by the bank to the blocked account. This contrasts sharply with the pension schemes 
around in many EU countries, where workers have no way of seeing the nominal values of their 
pension schemes are developing during their working life. It is often only when the retirement 
age approaches, that the worker becomes aware of his pending pension benefits. More 
transparency not only makes workers more aware, it can also help them decide whether they 
need to work more or less according their future income wishes.14 In addition, if there are 
motives to leave bequests for survivors there will be a personal incentive to work more. The 
lump sum of money that the worker sees accumulating in the bank account is an accurate 
reflection of what has been earned and what will be paid out once the account is unblocked at 
retirement. 
Second, by saving in a simple risk-free bank savings account, the worker incurs next to no costs. 
An ordinary bank savings account cost 10 to 30 euros a year in 2010, for complete 
administration of the account.15  
                                                          
14 Actually, there is also a macroeconomic benefit to this transparency as freeriding is not possible (see 
also Holzmann and Palacio, 2001, on this point). Due to the transparency, workers that have not 
accumulated enough have an incentive to start working more, by working more hours or, for instance, 
accumulate a different type of human capital if the market pays a high price for it so that he can switch to 
better-paid jobs. Macro-economically, this will lead to more people at work, which is conducive for 
economic growth, in particular in ageing societies. 
15 There is no reason for banks to charge more costs, as in the case of individual risk-free savings accounts 
they possesses the funds of the worker over a long period until the worker’s retirement age due to the 
blocked character of the account. Using this money for other purposes is at the risk of the bank, and not of 
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Figure 7 Operating costs of collective pension funds in 2010 
% of total assets 
 
Source :OECD, Pension markets in focus, July 2011. 
Note: The total operating costs include all costs of administration and investment management involved 
in the process of transforming pension contributions into retirement benefits, such as collecting 
contributions, sending contributions, sending contributions to investment fund managers, keeping 
records of accounts, sending reports to participants, investing the assets, converting account balances to 
annuities and paying annuities. 
 
As investment in equity or bonds does not take place, there are no trading costs or additional 
costs for governing a portfolio of investments. The cost benefit for the worker can be seen in 
Figure 7. It shows the average operational costs of collective pension funds in 14 countries of 
the EU, ranging from 0.1% (Denmark, Portugal) to more than 1.0% (Czech Republic, Spain) of 
the total assets. The simple average is 0.5% and thus relatively high16 in comparison with the 
fixed costs of 10 to 30 euros a year for a bank savings account. These costs significantly depress 
returns (comparable with our   in the previous section). Moreover, the OECD does not yet have 
information about the costs made in the remaining 13 countries of the EU and this may indicate 
that the average costs in the EU are even higher. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the worker. The pension savings should thus also be fully covered by the national deposit guarantee 
system.  
16 Obviously, these percentages are averages for the pension funds so there are pension funds with much 
higher costs than mentioned here. Moreover, the percentage of costs reported here are lower. See 
Mitchell (1996) on administrative costs of public systems, including management fees. 
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Third, with individual pension schemes, workers will no longer be subject to the whims of a 
government or other pension fund managers during or after retirement in case of an. This 
independence is a valuable advantage that is not part of most pension schemes in the EU. If 
workers are part of a scheme governed by the government, the pension funds risk being used to 
fill the holes of public finance deficits, although this is not ethical and sometimes even illegal. 
However, history has shown that ministers of finance, in need of funds and under pressure by 
the public can be tempted to use pension funds to pay for current expenditures. The dire state of 
public finances related to the sovereign debt crisis, such as in the economies at the rim of the 
EU, increases the likelihood of this happening.17 If a government is likely to need the pension 
funds to use for public funding, the greater the incentive to keep its workers in the dark about 
the state of their pension schemes. In countries where other funds’ managers govern the 
accumulated sum of money there are also rules that these managers can change in the course of 
time. For instance, governments may decide to stop indexing the growth of the pension benefits 
at consumer price inflation, or may change the pension replacement rate. In times of financial 
crises, incurring depressed investment outcomes, or an ageing population, where funds’ 
expenditures exceed income, there is pressure on fund managers to change the rules. The 
change of rules is particularly problematic when it occurs after retirement because the worker 
is unable to replenish income by working (more) to save more.  
The conclusion of these three benefits for the worker is that it is better to be safe than sorry.18 It 
is better to take the safer option and have a simple savings account where the accumulation of 
funds during a working lifetime is transparent, in order to be able to adjust labour market 
participation if needed. It is better to be aware of the costs and outcomes and have low 
investment costs with a fixed return rather than to incur unknown costs in exchange for the 
possibility of high returns (such as investments in equity) and be sorry that pension benefits 
turn out to be lower than expected on retirement. Last but not least, being independent of 
governments or other fund managers, guarantees no unpleasant surprises will occur at a time 
when the individual worker is no longer able to augment income.  
                                                          
17 Adding to this, survey results show that the public in countries at the southern rim of the EU has a far 
higher preference for public pension schemes than in northern EU countries (see Figure 2 in Van Groezen 
et al., 2009). A high reliance on public pensions, an ageing society and a dire state of public finances are 
potentially sufficient ingredients for a cocktail triggering social unrest. 
18 The better safe than sorry expression applies also to two other meanings in this paper. The first is that it 
is better to save (money) than to be sorry later in life in discovering (too) late that not enough money was 
saved for the individual wishes (high pension, bequests, or low pension but more leisure earlier in life). 
The second is that there is no harm to remain on the safe side, and to accumulate risk-free pension funds, 
instead of investing in risky assets, as it is perfectly feasible to make ends meet (see section 4). 
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6. So why not implement an individual risk-free pension scheme? 
After examining the ability to pay and the benefits of an individual risk-free pension scheme as 
outlined in the previous sections, the counterarguments are now discussed. What reasons could 
be given why an individual should not favour an individual risk-free pension scheme?  
First, investing in a collective scheme with non-risk free investments can deliver higher returns and 
as a consequence lower pension contribution are required in order to reach lump sum at 
retirement. However, it has been shown that the return on pension contributions deposited by 
the worker and the employer in an individual savings account is on average no more than 2% 
points under the return on the same contribution deposited with a government or other 
pension fund (institutional investors, pension funds, insurance companies). Looking at the gross 
returns in a historical perspective, collective funds only rarely attained an average return of 6% 
whereas, even in times of worldwide low interest rates, the interest rate on a long-term savings 
account (10 years or longer) was 4.0%. Saving deposited in a blocked bank account where the 
funds are not accessible until retirement, often means even longer fixed terms and thus even 
higher interest rates. Figure 8 further shows that, apart from Denmark, the global recession 
years have led to dramatically low returns on collective pensions: of 0.8% on average for these 
16 EU countries. This evidently shows that the risk of missing-out on the higher returns of the 
more risky investment is outweighed by the risk of unacceptable losses.19 
A second argument against individual (risk-free) pension schemes could be an unwanted shift 
away from the social insurance concept and the tacit solidarity across and within generations. For 
instance, there is no insurance against the risk of the loss of human capital through illness. 
However, these insurances more related to sick pay that either the employer or the government 
is better able to carry. In most of the developed economies, these insurances are part of the 
  
                                                          
19 I like to cite here Sinha (2002), who compares the Latin American individual pension accounts with the 
US system that claimed to make on average a 6% rate of return, as it applies here also: Even if the stock 
markets produce a better rate of return it does not follow that the affiliates of the pension fund, even with 
100 percent investment in stocks, will get the same rate of return. The reason is, of course, the ubiquitous 
management fees that can eat up much (if not all) of the gain. See also Diamond (1999) on the size of 
administration costs with individual accounts. See also Hinz et al. (2000). It is furthermore interesting to 
point out that a 6% stock market return is overly optimistic. During 1921-1996 this held for the US, but 
other stock markets worldwide had, including dividends, a far lower return (see Goetzmann and Sinha 
(1999). 
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Figure 8 Gross returns of collective pension funds in 2008-10 
% of total assets 
 
Source :OECD, Pension markets in focus, July 2011. 
Note: No information is available for the other 11 EU countries.  
 
wider social security system and are not covered by pension funds. Insuring the loss of earnings 
through illness is expensive. Moreover, this solidarity is a social issue and not necessarily the 
responsibility of the individual employee. While collective pension schemes can relieve 
borrowing constraints and enable intergenerational risk sharing, they usually imposes uniform 
rules on heterogeneous participants (cited from Bovenberg et al., 2007). Pension saving over a 
lifetime, however, is largely in the hands of the worker. Workers should not be punished dis-
proportionally more than non-workers, in view of demographic developments and for the sake 
of the functioning of the common market single currency.20 
                                                          
20 Moreover, as Holzmann and Palacio (2001) argue,  individual accounts are a better way of dealing with 
labour market incentives and changing family patterns, such as divorces, multiple marriages or 
relationships over the life cycle, widowhood, and the resulting need for independent old-age security for 
non-working partners. Under an individual account system, accumulated resources can easily be split 
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A third argument against an individual (risk-free) pension scheme is the risk of cover and 
longevity. In the examples presented in the previous sections, one of the assumptions was that 
workers have perfect foresight and also know how long they will live. If pension savings accrued 
during a working life are estimated to cover 20 retirement years and the worker lives much 
there will clearly be a financial gap at an age when this is difficult to resolve. This is true, but it is 
a surmountable problem. Policy makers could impose the life-expectancy age as a guideline for 
workers and the few people who surpass this set age could be entitled to a special social 
security benefit. Alternatively, workers could be required by law to save for a minimum of 30 
years retirement. This period is achievable, under reasonable parameter settings, as followed 
from the calculations in section 4.  
A fourth argument against individual (risk-free) pension schemes is that some people are not 
capable of doing their own financial planning for, such a long period as a lifespan. This objective is 
often raised but, in my view, is rather weak. Learning to plan is an important skill and leaving 
this to others is generally more costly21 and in case of risk-free saving as outlined in the 
previous sections, there are only few parameters to decide upon.22 The pension contribution 
rate, as well as the workers and employers’ share, should be part of the wage-negotiation 
process. The pension scheme is still mandatory, as savings have to take place and the money on 
the savings account is inaccessible (blocked), so these are no decisions to make. The worker 
does not have to make any investment strategy decisions, as the bank will save the worker’s 
funds risk-free at the highest interest rate for each payment until retirement.  
There were no other arguments against individual risk-free pension schemes in comparison 
with collective riskier schemes.23 And general risks as the inflation risk affect both schemes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
after a divorce for the period marriage, aggregated with own and prior contributions and interest 
received, and supplemented by public resources in a transparent manner (for instance, for periods of 
child rearing). 
21 I share the view that planning pension savings is part of life such as a person’s choice for education, a 
career, family planning, or buying a house with a mortgage and a fire and burglary insurance. See also 
Milevsky, 2009.  
22 It is thus far from the US individual retirement account (IRA) where workers have to make many 
choices, among others how they will invest. See for instance Pozen and Hamacher 2011. 
23 I abstain here from a term life insurance, which benefits a worker’s survivors. In case a worker dies, the 
individual risk-free saved funds are anyhow at the disposal of the survivors at the retirement age of the 
worker. A term life insurance is extremely costly (up to 2.5% of the contributions) but often not needed, 
such as in case the survivor is able to work or entitled to other (social security) funds or if there are no 
survivors. 
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7. Summary, conclusions and policy recommendations 
In the past, the economies of the European Union all started building collective pension funds. 
This emerged at a time when there was a great need for solidarity and intergenerational risk-
sharing. The move towards these two national goals, separately or in combination, was in place 
well before the start of the European Economic and Monetary Union. 
However, times have changed. The European Union now also has a monetary union. The loss of 
national discretion on monetary policy, exchange rates and interest rate instruments, and the 
absence of a common fiscal policy means that the functioning of the labour market is of 
paramount importance. In the absence of a fully functioning fiscal union, only labour mobility 
can cushion the effects of asymmetric shocks that have hit some but not all of the economies of 
the monetary union.  
 In addition, demographic developments mean that the member states are ageing. Moreover, 
working-age populations are shrinking while there are more and more elderly dependents in 
the economy. This puts pressure from demographic change on the working-age population. The 
working-age population has to adapt in order to provide the needs in terms of goods and 
services of an aging society, and have to work more in order to pay the income for the larger 
generation of retirees. In addition, workers should not forget to save for their own retirement. 
To help them achieve this, the working-age populations should be given incentives to be flexible 
in the labour market. 
Although labour mobility in the European Union has significantly risen, it is still low. One of the 
impediments is the non-portability or costly portability of pension schemes for a worker across 
the borders. It would be better to facilitate and give EU workers incentives to cross borders for 
work. This is advantageous to the functioning of the European Union and to absorb the impact 
of demographic change, as explained above. In comparison with other factors that impact labour 
mobility, pensions could be a feasible and effective policy instrument for the EU policy makers 
to increase mobility. 
This paper argues that there are many arguments to move towards individual risk-free pension 
schemes, in particular for workers that cross borders but not exclusively. This type of pension 
scheme is by definition portable across EU-borders. Although it does exists on a very small 
scale, the majority of employers in the EU force their workers into collective schemes. Worker 
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cannot opt-out, unless they quit their job. However, once a worker leaves a job, transporting any 
accumulated pension across the EU borders is almost impossible or extremely costly.24 
This idea of an individual risk-free pension schemes hinges on the balance between government 
intervention and freedom of choice, which is often seen as social versus liberal, respectively, in 
the literature. Currently, most first-pillar (but also second-pillar) collective schemes accept a 
government-prescribed straightjacket. And if it is not the government then it is an intermediary 
insurance or pension company making the choices for the employee. The individual risk-free 
scheme promoted here does not fit in this system. Neither does it fit in the freedom of choice 
category, as paying pension contribution is still mandatory and there is no liberty in managing 
the funds due to the risk-free savings. The funds, however, remain in the hands of the worker 
and are thus transparent and portable. 
Apart from enhancing the labour market mobility, there are two other macroeconomic benefits 
from individual risk-free pension schemes. Firstly, the individual character of the scheme will 
create the right incentives and make non- or partly participating working-age persons aware of 
the need to participate and save more funds in order to make ends meet after retirement. This 
incentive to participate (fully) in the labour market could lead to more job vacancies being filled. 
Secondly, individual pension accounts can improve the social insurance aspect of public pension 
schemes, make them financially sustainable and even more redistributive (see Holzmann and 
Palacio (2001)). 
Furthermore, this paper shows that a worker can easily achieve a reasonable pension benefits 
over a long retirement period of 30 years if employers contribute their share of the pension 
savings. For workers retiring at the age of 67, 30 retirement years should take them well 
beyond normal life-expectancy. The nominal pension benefit is thus, without interference of 
others, apart from a solid bank account, fully guaranteed.  
I further show in this paper that an individual risk-free pension scheme has three main 
advantages for the employee. First, workers can clearly see what they will get. Second, the 
financial costs are next to nothing. Third, independent of the whims of government or other 
fund managers and workers will receive all the benefits accrued earned their lifetime.  
                                                          
24 One could argue that pushing more people into private schemes could increase the income inequality 
among retirees, which may be not desirable from a social point of view.  In contrast, Van Vliet et al. (2011) 
show that recent privatisations of public pension funds in advanced economies have not led to higher 
income inequality. 
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As the difference between market returns and risk-free bank savings account has diminished 
over the last decade and public finances are in trouble, there are no arguments from the return 
point of view either to validate forcing workers into collective risky investment schemes.  
A remaining question to be answered concerns what actions are needed by the EU policy 
makers to establish the EU-wide implementation of individual risk-free pension schemes. This 
question is easy to answer. Each EU-citizen who takes a job work across an EU border - but 
within the EU - should be entitled to a long-term interest-bearing bank savings account that 
accumulates the monthly pension contribution. This contribution comes from the employee and 
the employer, where their precise shares should be part of the job negotiation process. The 
savings account should be an EU-wide tax free, long-term interest bearing account that is 
blocked until the moment this EU-citizen reaches the retirement age, let us say, of 67. This 
account is called blocked as no money can be withdrawn until the owner reaches the age of 67, 
though it should be visible at all times to the owner of the account, so that the contribution 
payments of the employer and interest payments by the bank can be followed in the course of 
time. The banks that offer these bank accounts charges only minor costs, as they have huge 
sums of long-term savings in their possession for which they only have to pay a long-term 
interest rate. This interest rate should be as high as possible, for each payment in the account 
from the payment moment until the retirement age. The total funds on these pension schemes 
accounts should be part of the national deposit guarantee systems, as they are risk free. After 
the age of 67, the EU-citizen receives a monthly payment from this accumulated wealth for a 
predetermined number of years. As our calculations show, thirty years is feasible, so until the 
age of 97. For those exceeding this age, a safety net should be in place.  
At the discretion of the national governments, the EU nations can follow this stepwise 
implementation of the individual bank-savings-account pension accumulation in the EU. 
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